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The history of transition in Russia is analyzed in this paper. Issues ranging from 
managerial incentives to the changing structure of trade are considered in an attempt to 
present a comprehensive sketch of the state of the Russian economy. The transition in 
Russia can be compared with demobilization. Demobilization process is often 
accompanied by large output declines. For instance, during the post World War II 
demobilization the US GNP declined by 25%. In light of this, the great contraction of the 
Russian economy does not appear to be a major outlier when the militaristic nature of the 
Soviet economy is taken into account. We point out a previously unexplored factor 
detrimental for incentives of Russian managers, which we call soft taxation. Soft taxation 
is a free market analog of soft-budget constraints. Due to the inefficiency of institutions, 
managers have an incentive to take costly actions in order to signal that the profitability 
of the firm is low. Also, we suggest a few indices of aggregate economic shocks 
including one based on the structure of foreign trade. The values of the indices of 
aggregate shocks for the Russian economy are compared to those of several other 
countries. The data seem to indicate that the changes in the structure of Russian trade 
have been far greater than in non-transition economies. However, other indices of 
economic adjustment do not paint a picture of a rapid transition. 
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Introduction 
Russia is the most interesting country that moved from central planning to market organization of 
economic activities in the past decade.  Not only is it the largest and most powerful of the group of former 
communist countries, but it practiced central planing far longer than any other country.  The USSR was the 
only country in Europe where the transitions to a command economy and back to a decentralized enterprise 
system were endogenous developments.  Other eastern European nations adopted command methods under 
Russian pressure, but returned to free enterprise once that pressure was eliminated.  Despite Russia’s 
seemingly aggressive movement toward a market economy, growth rates have apparently remained non-
positive throughout the 90s.  Poland and the Czech Republic also adopted rapid market approaches but have 
had higher growth.   
Policies adopted by the Soviet Union when it embarked on the path of reforms were not intended to 
turn it into fifteen independent capitalist nations.  Rather, Gorbachev hoped that perestroyka would 
strengthen socialism by making it more efficient and more humane.  The transition to capitalism was a 
largely unanticipated consequence of the changes initiated by Gorbachev.  Reforms were shaped by political 
instability and power struggles among constituencies.  Thus, the changes that took place in the former Soviet 
Union were somewhat myopic.  Policies lacked a consistent strategy and have often conflicted with each 
other. Sometimes they were aimed at keeping unemployment low, at other times at keeping inflation low.  
Inconsistent energy price policies and implicit subsidies were deployed to prevent bankruptcy.  Near election 
times prompt payment of government employees' wages and retiree pensions gained top priority.  
Notwithstanding the fact that many reforms have been ad hoc and not dictated by economic efficiency 
considerations, the general direction of the reform process is unambiguously transforming Russia into a free 
enterprise economy.  During the past decade, military procurements in the economy have shrunk by an order 
of magnitude.  An enormous fraction of Russian resources have been turned over to private ownership and 
control.  Privatization was shaped and supported by bureaucrats and administrators who became significant 
owners in the newly privatized industries.  That a substantial part of the ruling elite became capitalists has 
probably been instrumental in propelling Russia towards capitalism. 
Private ownership, decentralized control, the decline of the military, and reliance on markets were 
bound to cause huge structural changes in the Russian economy.  These will ultimately improve the 
allocation of resources and economic welfare.  Restrictive state control of consumption that greatly limited 
the number and availability of goods under the old regime is being replaced by more diverse individual  
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demands and choices among a wider set of goods and services.
2 Replacing state monopoly and bureaucratic 
control of capital with competition among private producers is bound to change the way production is 
organized and the ways in which new investments are directed.  Opening the Russian economy to the 
pressure of world prices and the ability to trade with the rest of the world at those prices ultimately will 
provoke major shifts in the composition of industries.  Major economic changes occur even in countries that 
are not undergoing fundamental transformations in their economic and social structure. In a sense all 
economies undergo continual transition, but the changes required in Russia are much greater than elsewhere, 
because production starts from a baseline that is seriously out of whack while the social institutions and 
infrastructure that sustain decentralized markets must be constructed from scratch. 
 Such changes require mobility of factors of production.  Labor must move from firms using 
outdated technologies and from those producing products that are not in great demand toward those that are 
viable in the world economy.  New investments are required.  It is costly to transform capital once used for 
producing military hardware to produce consumer goods.  Collectivized land, whose uses were dictated by 
central authorities, must be used in different ways.  Changes in crop mix and cultivation practices require 
mobility of farm labor and capital, and may also require learning new technologies--investments in human 
capital.  Finally, technologies adopted by bureaucratic planning methods are not appropriate for a 
decentralized, competitive market system.  Included in technology are issues that involve marketing, 
infrastructure, and regulation.  Acquiring new technology is a costly and long drawn out process. 
Many economists view transition-economies as a “special case,” largely irrelevant for understanding 
how other market economies function.  It is true that many important institutional deficiencies of the Russian 
economy are limited to transition economies and, perhaps, to some developing countries.  Yet there are 
general lessons to be learned from the Russian experience.  Studying transition economies provides a unique 
opportunity to investigate adjustments of an economy to large demand and price shocks.  They have great 
potential for illuminating general rules of how resources move to their highest valued uses. 
Soviet society had a militaristic style and orientation.  Life was highly structured, control was rigidly 
hierarchical, and inequality was low.  Soviet central planning followed the army organizational chart in 
many ways.  Commands issued from the chief authorities related, at least in a broad sense, to most aspects of 
economic life.  Many social activities were regulated as well.  Gosplan set output targets and input 
allocations from above.  Individual managers served, in a sense, as the officer corps.  Their attempts to meet 
plan targets were motivated by potential changes in status, penalizing managerial failure by demotions and 
rewarding managerial success through promotions.  Consumption was distributed much like that of a 
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military organization.  Monetary inequality was low and many goods and services were provided directly by 
employers.
3  The number of different goods received, their availability, and their quality depended on one’s 
rank.  Party members received special treatment.  Quality of housing, medical services and general shopping 
privileges depended on level in the state hierarchy, yet differences in status between the highest and lowest 
members of society were much narrower than in most market economies.   
In many ways the Russian transition is comparable to the demobilization that occurred after WW II 
in Western European economics.
4 The quasi-military structure no longer applies: goods used to sustain the 
empire are no longer needed. In the Soviet Union, every industry was state owned and every worker was a 
“soldier” in the state’s economic army.  Now every person must be more responsible for himself and place 
less reliance on higher authority.  Different goods have to be produced to cater to private rather than to 
“public” tastes.  In considering the Russian situation, it must be borne in mind that the restructuring 
associated with military demobilization is substantial.  As the war in Europe and later in the Pacific came to 
a close, gross domestic product in the United States fell drastically. GDP was 25% lower in 1947 than it was 
in 1944.
5  While this decline is not as dramatic as the official numbers reveal for Russia, the American GDP 
decline was large.  It was much larger in countries physically ravaged by war. The analogy of Russian 
transition to demobilization is further strengthened by the fact that unemployment remained remarkably low 
in both 1940’s U.S. and 1990’s Russia, and in both cases many workers (especially women) withdrew from 
the labor force. The demobilization comparison provides a meaningful historical perspective and reveals that 
the Russian experience may not be as much of an outlier as appears on the surface. Nonetheless, the 
demobilization that occurred in the U.S. in the mid-forties was not as drastic as what is happening in Russia 
today.  
It is not even clear that the official statistics indicating output reductions of 40% or more for Russia 
are economically credible.  For one thing, data on Russian national income are inconsistent with data on 
output.  Income estimates for 1992-5 show a rising trend, whereas industrial output shows a drastic decline.
6  
The state statistical agency was designed to coordinate planning among state-owned-enterprises, not to 
measure output in the private sector where most growth has occurred. Market economies with weak central 
governments yield economic data only grudgingly, and the vast changes in the structure of control and the 
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5The source is Dept of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Gross Domestic Product in 1992 Dollars, 1932-
1997,” (1998). 
6 The source is OECD, “Economic Surveys: The Russian Federation, 1995.”  For estimates of the magnitude of 
economic decline also see Koen and Gavrilenkov (1994).  
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lack of standardized accounting methods make the data situation even worse in Russia.  By anyone’s 
reckoning, there is an enormous amount of unrecorded personal and “underground” economic activity.  Of 
course lack of data is the least of Russia’s problems, but it does affect the degree of confidence with which 
progress, or lack thereof, can be assessed.   
Soviet planning sustained a remarkable number of distortions before 1991.  Imperfect capital-
budgeting procedures and ideological confusion about the nature of interest charges encouraged excessively 
capital intensive production methods.  Very low user prices for energy reinforced it.  Oil and natural gas 
were allocated to very low valued uses.  The consequences became immediately apparent after Eastern 
European countries broke from Soviet control and were eventually forced to pay market prices for oil and 
gas.  The effects were equivalent to a belated “oil shock” that shook western economies more than two 
decades ago.  When Ukraine was forced to pay market energy prices after the break-up of the Soviet Union, 
cars stood idle, houses were unheated through very cold winter months, and airplanes were grounded 
because fuel could not be obtained.   
The Economics of Slow Transition 
Changes in output, income and resource allocation in transitions are well described by the standard 
economic model of economy-wide responses to permanent, but previously unanticipated demand and supply 
shocks.  There are three main elements in the process.  One is the extent of the shocks and the distance or 
deviation the economy must travel to reach the new equilibrium.  Since short-run elasticities of supply and 
demand are smaller than long-run elasticities, there are important legacies of the old regime that show up in 
initial conditions in the new regime. These appear in the form of falling quasi-rents on capital carried over 
from the old days, and entry and investments in new lines of business.  Second is the speed of adjustment of 
resource movements.  Since fast adjustments are more costly at the margin than slow adjustments, the 
movement of resources from old to new uses necessarily takes time.  These adjustment costs must be 
considered in a broad context, including not only “transport costs” and the like, but also imperfections in 
capital markets, accumulated wealth available to individuals to invest in new ventures, and the flexibility of 
housing markets.  Third is the nature of expectations.  Adjustments go faster when long-term expectations 
are more stable and the targets of new opportunities seen by individuals remain clearly defined.  Uncertainty 
about long-term stability converts more elastic permanent adjustments into a sequence of more jumpy and 
disconnected short-horizon adjustments, and slows down the process.  All these elements are seen in Russia 
today.
7 
 The fixity of capital inherited from the old regime gives rise to quasi-rents, which makes it 
worthwhile to use old machines until the capital is used up.  An American example involves the use of the 
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railroads.   Certain train routes are used because the tracks are already there.  Given that the value of the 
usage is high enough to cover variable costs, it pays to continue to run trains on that route.  However, it 
would not pay to lay the tracks today.  The cost of that venture would be too great and predicted revenues 
could not cover the fixed costs.  If the value of capital is less than reproduction costs, it is not replaced and 
the business decays at the rate of depreciation.   
In the former Soviet Union, emphasis was placed on industrialization, and especially on heavy 
manufacturing.  Military production alone accounted for a large part of production and a much larger share 
of GDP consisted of military goods than in the US and other western countries.  These endowments give 
Russia a temporary comparative advantage in those same businesses.  But the long-term comparative 
advantage is likely to lie elsewhere.   In these industries, as in the case for U.S. railroads, a large share of 
total cost consists of fixed costs, so the transition away from these industries is bound to be slower than in 
many other transition economies where these legacies are less important.  
In addition, Russians have little knowledge of the production of those kinds of consumer goods that 
are viable on the world market.  Russian steel is more likely to be competitive with Japanese steel than is a 
Russian VCR with a Japanese VCR.  But given world prices, the product mix of the past is not likely to be 
the product mix of the future.  Developing new products may involve copying or creating technologies that 
are not well understood in Russia right now.  A good example involves marketing.  Because the prices of 
consumer goods were set below market levels, Soviet authorities spent little effort on marketing products to 
Russian consumers.  Pricing below-market-clearing levels in a sense transferred marketing functions to 
consumers as a cottage industry in terms of consumer queues and subsequent private trading.  In the new 
environment, where Russia must sell its goods in competition with those from other countries, more 
specialized marketing skills must be developed. 
Quasi-rents also depend on wages.  Declining real wages have made quasi-rents on old capital larger 
than usual, thereby delaying adjustments.  The magnitude of the decline in output and the speed of transition 
depend on general equilibrium effects.  If a larger proportion of enterprises is in the situation of reducing 
their output, this decreases the demand for labor, driving wages down and mitigating the effect of an output 
decline.   The less elastic is the supply of labor, the smaller is the decline in output since most of the effect 
takes the form of a decrease in wages, rather than a decrease in employment.  A large enough fall in the 
price of labor would not only affect short run output, but would allow variable costs to fall enough so that 
there might even be some reinvestment in plant and equipment in declining industries.  
The evidence reported below reveals that wages did fall significantly.  Employment fell somewhat, 
but to a much smaller extent than output did.  This suggests that in declining industries, hour reductions 
occurred, capital was not being replenished, or both.  Given the decline in demand for many products, it is 
no surprise that reinvestment in capital to bring the old plants up to efficient levels would be minimal.  But  
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in addition, some pull of labor from the old sectors to new sectors occurred, keeping wages from adjusting 
enough to prevent a sharp fall in output in older industries. The retail sector grew significantly and the 
number of small, private firms increased substantially.  The movement from old industries to new ones, 
which takes time, coupled with the lack of reinvestment in old sector capital, caused a decline in output.  As 
old capital wears out and is replaced by new capital in the sectors in which relative prices are increasing, 
increases in output in the new private sector should overtake decreases in output in older industries.  
The data reveal less than full adjustment in the patterns of production despite the changes brought 
on by world prices.  For example, the heavy manufacturing production that was overemphasized in the 
USSR has not declined as much as has light manufacturing.  The move to a market economy has increased 
demand for consumer goods, but the suppliers of consumer goods are almost exclusively other countries.  
Few goods of this kind are currently produced at home. Though the specificity of Russian physical and 
human capital gives Russia a short-term comparative advantage in heavy industry, it is disappointing that we 
have not seen much investment or labor mobility into medium- to large-size establishments in new lines of 
business. Some structural reasons for this are discussed below, including only a nascent housing market, 
passport control and an ill-functioning banking system and capital market.  However, political instability and 
uncertainty about claims on property in the long-term certainly must play an important, but hard to quantify 
role in deterring new investments.
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Basic Facts about Post Reforms Evolution of Russia 
Trade 
There has been much interest in the evolution of Russian trade policies in light of its intention to 
join the World Trade Organization.  Issues pertaining to Russian trade policy and steps undertaken by the 
country to conform to WTO rules are discussed in Michalopoulos and Drebentsov (1997) and Brenton, 
Tourdyeva, and Whalley (1997).  The structure of Russian international trade as assessed by official 
statistics is summarized in Table 1.  Natural resources account for well over half of Russian exports.  The 
share of trade with former Soviet Republics has been declining over the last few years, while trade with 
western countries has been growing.
9  According to official statistics Russia has maintained a substantial 
trade surplus during the transition period, yet there is a multi billion dollar uncounted "luggage trade" 
between Turkey, Poland, China and Russia.  The size of this unregistered trade is difficult to estimate.  Since 
                                                           
8 For a detailed analysis of the political economy of the Russian reforms, see Shleifer and Treisman (2000) 
9 Djankov and Freund (2002) find, however, that past linkages, such as infrastructure, production
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 limited the reorientation of trade.  
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imports are subject to tariffs, the amount of unregistered imports is likely to be greater than that of 
unregistered exports and we reasonably speculate that the trade surplus is overestimated.   
Russia is becoming an increasingly open economy.  Table 2 reveals that the volume of international 
trade is continuously increasing.  Between 1992 and 1996 total exports doubled and total imports increased 
by about 50%. However, it is not obvious that the share of trade in Russian GDP has increased since the 
beginning of the reforms.  Two possible ways of computing the share of exports relative to GDP give 
different answers.  We can compute either the percentage of GDP that can be purchased with export 
revenues, or we can consider the ratio of the value of exported goods to GDP computed in international 
prices.  The two measures are equal only if domestic prices are the same as international prices.  In fact, at 
the beginning of the transition there was a striking disparity between the two.  According to the first 
definition, the ratio of exports in rubles to Russian GDP has been declining during the transition period from 
64% of GDP in 1992 to 23% in 1996 (based on IMF statistics).  Thus, at least in theory, 1992 export 
revenues were sufficient to buy well over half of Russian gross domestic product.
 10 If the second definition 
is used--the ratio between exports denominated in US dollars and the value of Russian GNP computed in 
world prices--then the picture is drastically different.  Exports in 1996 are less than 6% of GNP in 1992 and 
steadily grow during the transition to 14.3% of GDP by 1996.  This example is more than a curiosity.  It 
highlights the magnitude of changes in purchasing power parity between the U.S. dollar and ruble.  Also 
while the real volume of exports has been increasing over the last few years the purchasing power of export 
revenues on the domestic market has been steadily declining.   
Investment 
In 1994 Magdi Iskander, the Director of Private Sector Development Department of the World Bank 
characterized the restructuring in Russia in the following words: 
"Products are being re-designed to meet market demand; labor is being shed; and new investments are being 
planned  (but postponed until the economy is more stable).  In sum, the enterprise level picture is mainly a 
positive one.” [from L. Webster et. al., "Newly Privatized Russian Enterprises," World Bank, 1994]. 
In fact, the level of real investment and Russian capital stock declined drastically following reforms.  The 
official numbers reveal a decline of 63% between 1992 and 1997. 
The existing capital stock is the most tangible legacy of the communist period.  The machinery of 
many Russian enterprises is old.  The average age of a Russian plant and equipment increased from 10.8 
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years in 1990 to 14.1 years in 1995
11.  Capital is depreciating faster than it is being replaced.  Investment 
declined by more than 10% in every year of the transition prior to 1997.  In spite of the stock market boom, 
it fell by another 5.5% in 1997.  The decline in the capital stock can be attributed partly to the unfavorable 
investment climate caused by political uncertainty and unclear property rights, and in part because for many 
types of capital the Soviet capital stock was probably well above the efficient level.  Soviet economic 
doctrine held that expenditures on investments in machinery manufacturing had priority over agriculture and 
consumption goods manufacturing.  The service sector was deliberately kept at a minimal level, as it was 
considered to be unproductive according to the Marxist notion of productivity.  It is easy to document that 
the Soviet commitment to investment in heavy industry was a real economic policy, not lip service to 
ideological dogma.  For instance, the Soviet Union boasted the world's largest steel output.  The 
transportation system was biased towards railroads (Table 3), while the highway network remained 
extremely underdeveloped.  The level of domestic steel consumption was far out of proportion to GNP.  
Given the bias of Soviet planning towards heavy machinery, one might expect the transition to cause an 
increase in production in light industry, agriculture and the service sector.  In reality light industry has 
suffered the greatest measured output decline during the last decade (about 80%).  Agricultural output also 
declined sharply (by 50% in some areas of agriculture).  Only the service sector expanded as expected. 
If the decline in capital stock can be explained partly by aggregate uncertainty and excess 
accumulation of some types of capital in the Soviet era, Russian enterprises remain starved of working 
capital and need investment in restructuring.  There are several reasons for this: 
Overlapping property rights and unenforceable contracts are the most frequently cited cause of low 
investment.  Even if a loan in Russia is “guaranteed” by collateral, a lender may not be able to repossess the 
collateral in case of default.  Consequently, Russian banks are very reluctant to finance industrial 
enterprises.  Table 4 shows that the ratio of non-financial sector credit to GDP in Russia is lower than in 
other Central and Eastern European Countries.  Note further that Table 4 contains two CBR and Goskomstat 
estimates of the credit/GNP ratio.  While the estimates of CBR and Goskomstat are close in 1993, there is 
almost 100% difference in 1994 and in 1995.  This is a testimony to lack of consistent accounting methods 
and standards, and raises further questions of data reliability.   
Until now, the market for Russian government debt has been part of world credit markets, so the 
risk-adjusted interest rate on Russian government paper should be no greater than general market returns.  In 
fact the $12.5 billion official current account surplus
12 suggests that Russia is exporting capital.  The overall 
                                                           
11 The source is Goskomstat.   All other estimates in the paper are based on Goskomstat data, unless otherwise 
indicated. 
12 The trade surplus of 12.5 billion is for the first nine months of 1997.  In 1996 the trade surplus was over $14.6 
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structure of public finance in Russia right now creates an environment where government operates at the 
brink.  Its revenues are highly correlated with business activity.  Russia’s ability to repay public debt 
depends closely on the private sector’s ability to make good on its debt.  Consequently, returns on 
government and private debt are highly correlated and are substitutes in portfolios.  This is true to a much 
greater extent than it is in the United States and other leading economies. 
Social Problems 
   The social costs of transition in Russia have been large.  In addition to the decline in measured GDP, 
reforms have been accompanied by a decline in life expectancy, and by a dramatic increase in income 
inequality and crime.  Between 1985 and 1993 recorded crime doubled.
13  Table 5 reveals that over the past 
decade male life expectancy has fallen by more than 8 years, though the trend started before that.  According 
to the data reported in Table 6 in 1994 the poverty headcount in Russia was greater than in other eastern 
European countries wit comparable per capita GNP, while the life expectancy in Russia is the lowest in the 
group.  Treml (1997) documents increasing Russian alcohol consumption.  The number of deaths from 
alcohol poisoning sharply increased from 10.8 per 100,000 in 1990 to 37.4 in 1994.  These social and 
economic costs of reform are far greater than expected.   
The highly compressed, militaristic wage structure in Russia prior to 1991 produced a Russian Gini 
coefficient comparable to those in Western European countries with the most egalitarian income 
distributions.  By 1994 inequality in Russia increased to the US level, but with a much lower average level 
of income.  Relative inequality is large indeed.  Commander, Tolstopiatenko and Yemtsov (1997) and 
Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) provide a wealth of information about income inequality in Russia.
14  
Table 7 shows that the increase in inequality occurred between 1991 and 1994 and declined slightly 
thereafter. Combined with a decline in GNP and removal of most food subsidies, the increase in income 
inequality has created hardships for many poor families.  For example, it forced them to change their diets to 
cheaper food, such as bread and potato. From Table 8, we learn that in 1990, meat and milk products had 
twice as much weight in the Russian diet as did bread and potatoes.  By 1994, the ratio fell to 1.3.  Still, 
instances of outright hunger and starvation are very rare.  A large fraction of food is self-produced on small 
plots and average daily caloric consumption is not much different than before.   
The data on Russian income and its distribution are notoriously unreliable.  In a society where tax 
avoidance is widespread, average reported income levels are biased downward.  Also, collection of income 
                                                           
13 See Anderson (1995), Leitzel (1995), Alexeev, Gaddy, and Leitzel (1995) for analysis of crime in the Russian 
economy. 
14 The Gini coefficient in Sweden (1987) is 0.30, in Germany (1984) is 0.304, in the US (1992) is 0.466 and in Chile 
(1994) is 0.565.  For a comparative study of inequality among eastern European countries see Atkinson and 
Micklewright (1992).  
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data is complicated by double-digit inflation combined with delays of several months or more in wage 
payments.  Consumption of agricultural products and luxury good helps give a more accurate picture of the 
changes in income distribution.  Consumption of beef sharply declined, reflecting both the removal of beef 
subsidies and the declining income of the poor.  Consumption of cheap food such as bread has increased 
during the transition period, suggesting that the income of the poor has declined.  For data on food 
consumption and production see Table 9 and Table 8.  An OECD report in 1995 points out that data on 
bread consumption are suspect because while Goskomstat reports a decline in bread production it also 
reports an increase in bread consumption.  Goskomstat data are indeed suspect; however, this discrepancy 
can be explained by the fact that bread was heavily subsidized under the Soviets, making it so cheap that 
many farmers used it to feed their livestock.  The number of automobiles per 1000 people has increased 
dramatically and imports of expensive Swiss watches are booming, suggesting that incomes of the 
individuals in the upper percentiles of the income distribution have increased.   
Official statistics indicate that agricultural output declined sharply during the transition period.  
Import pressure and dwindling demand are blamed for the declines, but it should be kept in mind that large 
numbers of students and workers were sent to villages in the fall to help with the harvest during the Soviet 
era.  Market reforms put an end to this practice, so effective labor input in the agriculture fell substantially.  
The agricultural sector is one of many areas where Russian reforms contrast sharply with the Chinese reform 
experience.   
The process of reform in China largely started in rural areas (Li, 1994).  The release of labor from 
agriculture allowed market-oriented village enterprises to achieve impressive productivity growth and 
branch out into other sectors.  In contrast, Russian reforms started in urban areas.  The countryside has 
lagged far behind in the reform process. Individual farmers cultivate less than 5% of Russian agricultural 
land. Interestingly, among the owners of private farms, 75% are from the cities. Private farms are far from 
booming.  According to Goskomstat, their numbers are slowly declining. At the same time, the share of 
agricultural output produced on private subsistence plots increased almost two-fold since 1990 and now 
approaches half of the nation’s agricultural output.  This is surprising because production on subsistence 
plots is carried out by very primitive means, without the use of any machinery.  The reasons why 
restructuring of Russian agriculture has not occurred are poorly understood. Possibly, a complex web of 
political forces creates a propensity for local governments to treat private farmers unfavorably. This 
possibility is consistent with work by Zhuravskaya (1988) demonstrating that the current revenue sharing 
system with the regional government provides no fiscal incentives for the local governments to increase their 
tax base. 
Labor   
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As in all markets, an efficient labor market ensures that labor is allocated to its highest valued use.  
Higher wages and better career prospects give workers incentives to move in a decentralized, market 
economy.  The facts about labor allocations in Russia do not paint a convincing picture that labor has been 
moving to more productive uses.   For one thing, employment fell by much less than output over the period.  
If labor supply among those who remained in the labor force is inelastic, demand shocks that reduce labor’s 
value cause wage declines rather than employment declines.  More surprising, though, is that in the face of 
relative demand shifts, changes in employment across sectors have been slow. 
Earlier, we sketched how the changing of quasi-rents causes a gradual shift of output and inputs 
from declining sectors to growing ones in a normal market economy.  The Russian experience suggests that 
the reality is somewhat more complicated.  Table 10 reveals only a weak relation between employment 
changes and output changes across industries between 1992 and 1996.  For example, output in machinery 
declined 55% and employment declined 39% whereas output in light industry declined 78% and 
employment declined by only 38%. 
There is convincing evidence that work-sharing has been occurring on a large scale.  If  individual 
workers had the same alternative values of time, and set-up costs of work or leisure were small, output 
reductions would result in work-sharing and hours reductions. We do not have data on hours actually 
worked, so the point has to be pursued indirectly.  The unemployment level in Russia remained at less than 
10% during most of the transition period.  It increased to 11.5% by June 1998, still a very low number 
considering that measured GNP has declined by over 40% over the transition period so far.
15  And the 
duration of unemployment is remarkably short for a country that is in the midst of a severe contraction.   
While substantial numbers of workers have left the labor force, surely the lack of unemployment 
compensation has a direct bearing here (recall that unemployment was illegal in the Soviet era).
16  Table 11 
reveals that modal duration of unemployment is 3 to 6 months and that 9% of the unemployed find a new 
job within one month.  Only 10.5% are unemployed for more that a year.   Personal surveys of work 
activities reveal remarkable little moonlighting, second job holding or outside entrepreneurial activity.
17 
Labor markets clear in Russia.  Firms reduce wages to worker reservation levels and layoffs are 
relatively rare.  However, in order to maintain an output level that is almost 50% less than ten years ago, half 
as many workers as ten years ago should be necessary.  There are several possible explanations for this 
seemingly excessive employment.  One is to dismiss the official statistics regarding the GNP decline.  There 
are, after all, numerous instances were Goskomstat's numbers are clearly erroneous.  For example, data on 
computer industry development in Russia reported in Table 12 suggest that Goskomstat’s estimates may be 
                                                           
15 There are a number of possible explanations for labor hoarding, see for example Brown (1996), and Blanchard, 
Commander and Coricelli (1995). 
16 For a detailed study of the labor markets in the Soviet Union, see Granick (1987)  
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off by an order of magnitude.  However, the subsidiary social statistics reported above and other data make 
it is hard to deny that a Great Contraction has taken place.  For instance, an independent survey of Russian 
firms invariably finds that average capacity utilization is in the 50% to 60% range.  More testimony to the 
depth of crisis is the fact that the share of agricultural output produced by individuals for their consumption 
increased over the last seven years from 24% to 46% of total agricultural production.  The Russian 
Barometer survey found that production of food for personal consumption is the second most important 
source of welfare.  Most Russians ranked growing their own food as more important for their welfare than 
the benefits that they receive on the job. 
Russian firms maintain employment by adopting downward adjustments in wages and a work-
sharing model, whereas in the West it is common for some workers to be laid off while others work full time 
at their previous wages during downturns. Given the low levels of income in Russia today, it can be said that 
work sharing appears to be an “inferior good.”  But these differences in employment practice remain to be 
truly explained. We suspect that reconciling Russian work-sharing policies with layoff policies elsewhere 
will involve at least three considerations.  First, there are significant differences in welfare support to the 
unemployed and others in Russia today compared to the West.  Second, long term, permanent adjustments 
are required in the Russian economy compared to typical business cycle adjustments in postwar western 
economies, and permanent and temporary layoffs involve much different considerations, especially in the 
climate of uncertainty that has accompanied the transition.  Third, privatization caused many Russian 
workers to become significant shareholders in their firms.  Workers own more than 60% of total shares in 
privatized firms, and have been slow to sell their shares.  This differs from WW II demobilization in 
countries like Japan where workers were given significant shares in their firms after World War II, but 
quickly sold them. 
Structural Causes of Economic Decline  
Incentive problems and institutional deficiencies 
Suboptimal investment levels and diversion of capital to inferior uses are important sources of 
inefficiency in Russia today.  They occur in part because managers’ incentives are not aligned with owner 
interests, and because the accounting system does not provide information needed to monitor their actions.  
The legal system does poorly in prosecuting implicit and explicit thefts of company property by managers.  
The nature of the problem is illustrated by a hypothetical example.  Suppose a senior manager owns 5% of a 
firm.  A particular machine owned by the firm may be worth 1 million rubles if used by the firm but worth 
only one-half million elsewhere.  The 5% owner-manager earns 50,000 rubles if the machine is used in his 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
17 For a recent study of Russian unemployment, see Commander and Yemtsov (1995)   
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factory.  But he can sell it somewhere else for, say, 250,000 rubles (because its outside value is 500,000).  
Private incentives work against social interest in this case.  If the other owners of the firm could prevent the 
manager from taking this action, either by monetary incentives or by prosecution, efficiency would be 
maintained.  One problem in the current environment is the difficulty of detecting and dealing with 
“spontaneous privatization” and theft.  Western countries have much better accounting practices and better 
enforcement of anti-embezzlement laws than Russia has right now.  The opportunities for successful theft of 
company property that are present in Russia are relatively minor in western countries. 
An important aspect of infrastructure involves protection of private property, enforcement of 
contract law, and general stability of government structure and “the rules of the game.”  There is little doubt 
that the inability to establish a reliable government with effective contract and property right enforcement 
mechanisms has been an impediment to Russian growth.  The break-up of the USSR contributed to this 
problem because institutions that performed these functions in the past have not been replaced.  In the 
USSR, theft of state property was difficult because the Party organizations attached to firms performed 
monitoring functions.  Compression of wages and the utilization of non-market mechanisms for distributing 
luxury goods further discouraged large-scale theft.  An individual who tried to enjoy the rewards of the theft 
could be easily detected by a consumption pattern that was more lavish than that of peers.  Consumption was 
closely monitored in the USSR; it is not in Russia. 
A much-discussed feature of the current economic system in Russia is the inability to collect taxes.  
Tax collection becomes part of a game where tax officials become “extortionists,” and where those most 
able to resist such pressure pay the lowest taxes.  We refer to such a tax system as "soft taxation" because the 
eventual tax liability of a firm is influenced by factors other than legal rules and accounting statements.  We 
argue that "soft taxation" is both more distortionary and more disruptive than taxation practiced in developed 
western economies.  "Soft taxation" is caused by a dysfunctional accounting system.  It appears to be a 
significant obstacle to investment and the much needed restructuring in the economy.   
Incentives of workers and managers in the USSR were suboptimal for a number of reasons, 
including the well studied soft-budget constraints (Kornai, 1986; Maskin, 1999; Maskin and Chenggang, 
2001; Berglof and Roland, 2002)
18 and ratchet effects (Weitzman, 1980).  Bergson (1994) and Hall and 
Jones (1999) report that capitalist countries with the human capital and physical capital level of Russia tend 
to achieve a GDP about 50% greater than that of Russia in 1990.  Bernstam and Rabushka (1998) suggest 
that Russian income in 1997 is three to four "times lower that it could and should be."  Consequently, at the 
beginning of the reforms it was reasonable to expect that transition to a market economy would lead to rapid 
economic growth in the USSR.  In reality, the transition led to more than a 40% decline in measured GNP. 
                                                           
18 See Frydman et al. (2000) and Earle and Estrin (1998) for empirical results on the effects of “hardening” budget 
constraints in Russia.  
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What caused Russia’s output to decline by such a large margin and over such a protracted period? 
There are three primary causes: (1) Deficiencies, such as lack of financial and legal institutions necessary for 
successful functioning of a market economy; (2) Major aggregate price and demand shocks; (3) Aggregate 
uncertainty about future political and economic stability. 
Legal Institutions and Social Capital 
An important cause of economic decline is the absence of a kind of Social Capital necessary for a 
functioning market economy--institutions, legal infrastructure and managerial skills.  Williamson (1985) 
offers a thorough discussion of the role of institutions in a market economy. Greif and Kandel (1995) 
address the institutional deficiencies of Russian economy.  Blanchard and Kremer (1997) show how 
recontracting costs and the slow development of intermediate goods markets may be partly responsible for a 
sharp output decline in the transition. 
Under communist rule, the ministries and the Party policed industry performance and played a role 
performed by the legal system in capitalist countries.  The Party and ministries lost control and enforcement 
responsibility, and new institutions have been slow to emerge and take over these functions.  Under central 
planing, managers were tightly monitored.  The communist party and ministries detected and punished 
managerial fraud.  Each Soviet enterprise contained two major power structures: a “directorate” consisting 
of the director and administration, and a “partcom,” consisting of the leadership of the enterprise communist 
party organization.  One can view soviet-era enterprise-level communist party organizations as monitors of 
the administration of enterprises.
19   
Aside from this explicit system of checks and balances, there were other, less apparent obstacles to 
managerial fraud.  The surveillance activities of the secret service were not limited to dissidents.  The 
existence of a large network of KGB informants was common knowledge.  While Soviet managers probably 
knew little more than we do about the inner working of the KGB, they might have feared that the KGB 
monitored their behavior and reported the information to higher level executives or party officials.  And as 
previously noted, high consumption standards were difficult to conceal.  Ministries and the communist party 
also mediated and enforced inter-enterprise transactions and contracts.  Demise of these institutions created 
an unprecedented legal vacuum.  New institutions and mechanisms of control have been developing very 
slowly.
20  
Russia did not have western style accounting systems and institutions for shareholder monitoring of 
executives.  Russian courts were ill equipped to deal with the realities of a market economy.  Allegedly, the 
                                                           
19 Management interacted closely with local party leaders and knew each other’s functions well.  There was substantial 
overlap between administrative and the party elite in enterprises.   
20 See Clement and Murrell (2001), Fry (2001), and Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman (2001)  
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Soviet courts acted on the dictates of the Party officials so far as prosecution of economic crimes was 
concerned.  Aside from the absence of a strong and independent judicial system, Russia did not have 
adequate tax law, bankruptcy law, contract law or banking law.  There has been substantial legislative 
activity in these areas in the past decade.  The institutional structure for contract enforcement and property 
rights protection, however, is still far from what it should be in a well functioning free enterprise society.  
Buiter (2000) argues that insecure property rights have seriously depressed capital formation in the past 12 
years.
21  The rise of the “mafia” and criminality is a sure sign of weak social and political institutions.  One 
Russian businessman characterized some of the new institutions as follows: "The Mafia is as essential as the 
courts, and the tax police is as law abiding as the Mafia".   Andrea von Knopp of the German Businesss 
Association said, "Some firms had even been confronted by men in black 'looking like hitmen' sent by the 
tax service in a clear bid to intimidate staff.  It was clear from the beginning that the thing was not a tax 
audit," she said. 
The laws and accounting practices used in the command economy were a poor fit with the new 
economic realities.  Corruption and the lack of qualified accountants, lawyers, and civil servants make it 
difficult to create a functioning legal infrastructure even as new laws and western style accounting standards 
come into effect.  Small- to medium-size shareholders have little hope of reaping the fruits of ownership in a 
country characterized by poor accounting.  Indeed, both the government and the minority shareholders are 
entitled to a share of a firm's profits.  If the government is unable to collect taxes, the minority shareholders 
are unlikely to receive their share of the pie because small shareholders have little leverage for claiming it.  
Coyle and Platonov (1997) report that Russian accounting practices easily allow companies to hide their true 
profitability from outsiders.
22  This makes it easy for companies to avoid marginal tax rates on profits, which 
can be as high as 90%.  While lax accounting standards make it difficult for minority shareholders to enforce 
their claims on earnings, even the rights of majority shareholders may be ignored.  For instance, according to 
the law, the majority shareholder has a right to exercise control.  Yet, there are many anecdotal accounts of 
majority shareholder not being able to replace existing management.   
Nevertheless, there appears to be persistent, albeit slow progress in institution building.  Parties in 
dispute are more likely to resolve their differences in court than just a few years ago.  Table 13 reports that 
employment in regional and local judicial bodies increased by more than 50% between 1985 and 1995.  
Also, while the number of criminal cases declined by 13% in 1997, there was a 29% increase in the number 
of civil cases.  The number of cases brought against boards of directors and private and government 
administrators increased over 100%.  More importantly, as can be seen in Table 17, 83% of these cases were 
                                                           
21 Johnson et al. (1999a; 2000; 2002) also study the effects of contract enforcements and property rights on 
the process of restructuring.  
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won by plaintiffs, either completely or partially.  This may signal a modest improvement in protection of 
shareholder rights.  Of course, an increase in litigation is not necessarily a positive development.  However, 
in the context of Russia, an increase in the amount of litigation and a large success rate of cases brought by 
weaker parties against influential plaintiffs suggests that an independent judicial system is developing in 
Russia.   
But, if direct foreign investment is an indicator of property rights, then development of Russia’s 
legal and political institutions lags behind most other Eastern European countries.  Direct foreign investment 
per capita in Russia is far smaller than in other Eastern European countries, and the little direct foreign 
investment that exists in Russia is concentrated in Moscow and in oil producing regions.  As of 1996, among 
all Eastern European countries listed in Table 14, only Ukraine has per capita direct foreign investment 
below that of Russia. 
Under communist rule, the ministries and the communist party controlled managers and the 
“discipline of the plan” was the main motivator.  (Centrally set prices were typically below the market 
clearing price and while profit or loss of an enterprise were computed, profitability was not an important 
indicator).  Over the last several years, consumer prices on virtually all commodities and services have been 
completely market determined.  Markets developed in both retail and wholesale industry, putting an end to 
the queues and shortages characteristic of socialist economies.  The creation of a distribution network is 
among the main achievements of the reform.  A market-based system of distribution channels is a key 
element of a functioning capitalist economy.  The welfare gains from more efficient allocation of consumer 
goods appear non-trivial, but cannot be adequately quantified at this point.
23   
At the beginning of reforms, it was hoped that private (shareholder) ownership and competitive 
markets for inputs and outputs would replace the planning and monitoring functions previously carried out 
by the party and the ministries.  But institutional deficiencies described above have created substantial 
distortions in managerial incentives of privatized enterprises in Russia.  As a result of the privatization 
program, the managerial ownership share in Russia, averaging about 17%, is among the highest in the world.  
(See Blasi and Shleifer (1996) for evidence on Russian privatization).  Earle (1998) reports that only outside 
ownership share has significant positive impacts on productivity: managerial and worker ownership has no 
significant effect.
24  Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer and Tsukanova (1996) show that privatization by itself has 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
22 If true, this calls into question the reliability of output data. 
23  Indeed, under communist rule the system of chronic shortage insured that goods were not initially allocated to 
highest value users.  “Marketing” and redistribution of goods among citizens became an important cottage industry that 
never appeared in national accounts.  To assess the magnitude of welfare loss, it suffices to mention that black market 
prices for many consumer goods were 50% or 100% greater than the state price.   
24 Note that the ownership share of outsiders may increase either due to a decrease in the share of government 
ownership share or of insiders' ownership.    
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little impact on the likelihood of restructuring, though they do find that changing the management does have 
such an impact.   
Privatization and Incentives 
Privatization has received a great deal of attention from economists.  The share of GNP produced by 
private firms increased from under 10% in 1990 to over 60% in 1997.  In 1997 less than 9% of industrial 
output was produced in state-owned enterprises.  However, a number of studies mentioned above report that 
privatized and state enterprises exhibit similar trends in their behavior.  That the incentives of the managers 
may be driven not only by profit maximization, but also by desire to maximize the benefits and rents from 
control could account for the similarity in behavior of state and privatized enterprises.  A less cynical view is 
that, as the market system replaces the centralized system of resource and investment allocation, the state 
enterprises are subject to the same market pressures as the privatized companies (Aghion, Blanchard, and 
Carlin,1997).  Still, in other countries it is the growth of private capital, not privatization per se that is 
associated with economic growth.  This is also likely to be true in Russia of the future.  To the extent that the 
decline in output has turned around, or that the decline itself has been overstated, the main source of Russian 
growth will lie in the growth of new, private firms.  These firms will be smaller than the large state 
enterprises that were privatized. 
Furthermore, a high degree of managerial ownership does not necessarily ensure good managerial 
incentives.  As long as the accounting and legal tools for monitoring managerial performance are inadequate, 
managers may find it far more profitable to divert enterprise funds into their own pockets than to maximize 
shareholder value.  A common scheme in Russia is the following.  An executive of a privatized enterprise 
sells or rents out some of the assets of the enterprise to an outside entrepreneur for a nominal fee.  Most of 
the rent is paid in cash directly to the executive who makes the deal.  Of course, it is sometimes efficient for 
privatized assets to be used by independent outside parties.  However, inefficiency results if the fraction of 
the rent paid to a manager under the table exceeds his ownership share in the company.  Managers may 
focus on “rent-seeking activities,” similar to the ways in which bribery of public officials and police lead to 
inefficient economic activities. 
Three features of the managerial incentive problem can be shown analytically.  First, as the share of 
managerial ownership rises, incentives to steal from the firm decline.  Second, as the probability that the 
manager will keep his property rights in the firm declines, the manager steals more.  Third, as the rate of 
return on internal investment in the firm rises, stealing decreases.   
Consider a two-period situation.  The firm is initially worth V1 in period 1 and assets will grow at a 
rate of ρ from period 1 to 2.  Asset value in period 2 is V2.  (Think of ρ as the difference between the market 
rate of interest and the average return on capital invested in the current firm.  The market rate of interest is  
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assumed to be zero for the analysis).  A manager steals mi in period i at cost f(mi) with f’, f”>0.  The 
manager owns a fraction γ of the firm in period 1 and will own γ in period 2 with probability p.  With 
probability (1-p) he will own none of the firm.  The solution is found by solving the second period problem 
and working backwards.   
A manager who survives into the second period chooses m2 to maximize 
 
(1) m2 - f(m2) + γ (V2 - m2 ). 
 
The solution is to set   
 
(2) f’(m2) = 1- γ. 
 
Given optimal behavior in period 2, consider managerial behavior in period 1.  Since m2 does not 
depend on V2, the manager in period 1 is unconcerned with the effect of his actions on the optimal level of 
theft in period 2.  The period 1 problem is to choose m1 so as to maximize 
 
(3) m1  - f(m1) + p{m2   - f(m2) + γ (V2 - m2)} 
 
because the manager realizes the capital value of the firm in period 2 with probability p.  Now,  
 
(4) V2 = (V1 - m1 ) (1+ρ) . 
 
Substituting (4) into (3) and differentiating with respect to m1 yields the first order condition 
 
(5) f’(m1) – [1 -  pγ (1+ρ)] ≤  0. 
 
All the points stated above come from (2) and (5).   
First, is the standard result that the larger is the manager’s share of the firm, γ, the lesser the 
incentive to steal assets.  If γ = 1 the manager owns the entire firm and never steals in the second period.  If 
in addition property rights are secure (p = 1), equation (5) holds with inequality and theft doesn’t occur in 
the first period as well.     
Second, as p declines, the manager’s incentive to steal in the first period rises.  If there is a greater 
chance that the manager will lose the rights to the firm next year, he worries less about its capital value and  
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takes what he can get right now.  In the Russian context, uncertainty about future property rights induces 
managers to “take the money and run.”   
Third, higher returns to investing in the firm, ρ, reduce the manager’s incentives to steal.  If this firm 
is a very good investment, then the manager is less likely to steal.  But this effect interacts crucially with p 
and γ.  If the probability of retaining the firm is low or the manager owns very little of it, even very high 
rates of return on investment will not deter managerial theft very much.  Secure property rights are 
important, not only to investors directly, but to ensure that the incentives of managers are appropriate. 
An improvement in the protection of shareholder interests can be interpreted as a decrease in p or in 
γ. Current managerial incentives worsen if shareholder interests are expected to be better protected in the 
future, or if the likelihood of future termination of management increases.  The maturing Russian legal 
system will make it more difficult to defraud shareholders.  Though the long-run improvement in protection 
of shareholder rights enhances managerial incentives and efficiency, the short-term consequences may well 
be negative.  Similarly, while replacing management may facilitate restructuring and increase long-term 
profitability, managers who expect to be terminated in the near future are likely to engage in more inefficient 
rent-seeking activities. This theoretical argument has a number of significant practical implications.  For 
instance, it implies that if the value of the firm’s assets upon termination of a manager is expected to be 
positive, then earlier termination is efficient because it avoids further malfeasance.  Among Russian 
privatized enterprises many insolvent firms have accumulated large tax debts to the government.  Our 
arguments suggest that as long as the firm has some assets at the time when the management is terminated, it 
is more efficient to terminate old management sooner rather than later.  Unfortunately, the Russian 
government often follows the opposite strategy, postponing an inevitable bankruptcy for as long as possible.  
The management of a failing enterprise faces the worst possible incentives.  Managerial ownership shares 
provide practically no motivation at that point.  Managers have little incentive to preserve the assets of the 
enterprise because they expect to lose the benefits of control in the near future.
25   
Soft Taxation 
The deficiencies in managerial incentives described above are due to traditional principal-agent 
problems and incorrect valuations at the margin.  In the absence of shareholder control due to deficient 
accounting and legal systems, minority stake-holding by managers in a firm may result in perverse 
incentives.  But even an integrated owner-manager of a Russian privately held company may choose 
suboptimum uses of assets.  As we mentioned before, highly underdeveloped Russian accounting practices 
make tax collection very difficult.  Government failure to collect taxes despite many political claims on 
                                                           
25 Note, however, that Djankov and Murrell (2002) find that high management turnover leads to a higher amount of 
restructuring.  
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government resources has resulted in large budget deficits.  A substantial fraction of businesses in the 
"gray", off-books sector of the economy (estimated at over 30% of the GNP by Simachev, 1997) does not 
pay taxes.  Some large businesses with powerful political connections escape taxation and some firms 
undoubtedly bribe tax inspectors.  In spite of widespread tax evasion, government revenues were 25.8% of 
the GNP in 1996 (according to Goskomstat the government revenues were consistently over 25% of the 
GNP during the entire transition period).  It follows that for a large number of businesses taxes must be a 
heavy burden.   
It is often argued in the business press that balance sheets of Russian companies and particularly the 
profit numbers are virtually uninformative.  A brief glance at profit margins in the main sectors of industry 
reported in Table 15 lends indirect support to a view that accounting profits are meaningless.  According to 
the table, in four years of transition the profit margin in each industry sector is about two percent plus-or-
minus one percentage point.  Some of the industries represented in the table are capital intensive, some, such 
as production of fuel, are widely believed to be lucrative, yet some other industries represented in the table 
lost over half of their output since 1990.  In spite of this, there is no appreciable difference in profit margins 
among them and no sector reported losses in a four-year period starting in 1992. For the first time during 
transition, profits for a major industry sector (light industry) are estimated to be negative in 1996.   
It is alleged that since accounting statements are worthless, tax authorities assess tax liabilities of 
enterprises by relying on informal rules of thumb.  A likely scenario is that a tax inspector makes a guess 
about the ability of an enterprise to pay and demands payment.  If the enterprise refuses to pay, the tax 
inspector can inflict losses by disrupting or halting the firm’s operations.  More profitable firms are more 
likely to pay the requested amount, since disruptions are more costly for them.  Aside from being a relatively 
ineffective tool for raising revenues, this type of "soft" tax collection creates many distortions similar in 
spirit to these caused by soft budget constraints.  Firms may make it difficult to collect taxes, even if there 
are costs associated with imposing impediments. Barter transactions are normally associated with much 
higher transactions costs than normal market transactions, consequently, one should expect that only very 
cash and credit poor firms would engage in such activity.  Table 16 reveals that the use of barter has been 
becoming increasingly widespread.  Deficiencies of the banking system are the main reason behind barter.  
However, use of barter may be an effective way to make it difficult to collect taxes, thus reducing the firm’s 
tax liability.  While the tax authorities do take payments in kind, they are far less interested in such non-
liquid revenues.  Investment levels can also be adversely affected by soft taxation.  For instance, if  
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investment level is observable by tax collectors and profitability is positively correlated with the investment 
level then soft taxation might discourage investment.
26 
Macroeconomic shocks 
Large price and demand shocks can send any economy into crisis.  For instance, increases in oil 
prices are thought to be one of the primary causes of the 1970s recession.  The magnitude of this shock was 
smaller than the shocks sustained by the Russian economy.  The real price of coal in Russia more than 
doubled after 1991.  The price level in Russia relative to the US price level is reported in Table 17.  The 
overall prices in Russia increased from 2.5% of the U.S. price level in 1991 to 58% of the U.S. price level in 
1997. Consequently, the price of western imports relative to domestically produced goods declined sharply.  
Also the government freeze of individual savings in 1992 followed by triple digit inflation caused severe 
demand shocks and deep disruptions in business transactions.  Thus, at least partially, Russian economic 
decline can be attributed to demand and price shocks caused by removal of price controls and subsidies, 
sharp cuts in defense expenditures, monetary shocks, liberalization of trade with foreign nations, and barriers 
to inter-republic trade resulting from the break-up of the USSR.  While prices tend to adjust quickly, 
adjustments of factors of production are far from instantaneous (see Duflo and Senik-Leygonie, 1997).  
Aggregate employment declined by much less than output while real wages declined sharply (see Layard 
and Richter, 1995). 
Demand Shocks and Restructuring 
Macroeconomic shocks comparable to those in transition economies are extremely rare in western 
economies.  However, much can be learned in general from studying pathologies precisely because shocks 
of this magnitude are so infrequent elsewhere.  While at a first glance trade liberalization and removal of 
price controls might appear very distinct and hardly comparable shocks, these can be brought to the same 
denominator because both change relative prices and the quantities produced and consumed.   
We need an index of shocks and how the economy adjusts to them.  There are two desirable 
properties for a quantitative index measuring aggregate shocks.  First, the value of such an index must be 
independent of the unit of measurement.  Second, the value of the index must remain unchanged if we 
arbitrary divide some category of goods into two categories.  For instance, an index should remain 
unchanged if the category oil is split into two categories: oil produced on even and on odd days of a month.   
                                                           
26 In Russia as elsewhere, most investment comes from retained earning, thus a firm that undertakes an investment 
effectively signals that it is high type.  Thus, underinvesting can reduce current taxes.  
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Consider an index of aggregate shocks based on trade indicators.  It is easy to verify that the export 
shock index (ESI) defined as a weighted average of the absolute values of changes in exports in different 
sectors is consistent with the invariance conditions stated above.  Thus, define 
| |






t e e ESI  
where, 
t
i e is the ratio of values of exports that belong to a category i to volume of exports at time t.  An 
import shock index (ISI) is defined analogously.
27 
We estimate ESI/ISI using the data on five major trade categories for the US and Russia.  The 
estimates labeled ESI/ISI-5 are reported in Table 1.  The Russian export/import shocks index lies in the 8% -
24% range during the transition period.  In comparison, the U.S. index stays within 3% - 6%.  While 
inflation plays a very central role in macroeconomic policy discussions, the remarkable changes in relative 
prices and relative outputs have received far less attention.    
As the relative share of different sectors of the economy changes, a realignment of labor across 
sectors ought to follow.  Of course, adjustment of labor market is never instantaneous.  If the price of 
agricultural output were to triple for some exogenous reason the number of people employed in agriculture 
will not fully adjust overnight, even if the demand change is permanent.  We define employment adjustment 












i l is the fraction of labor force employed in industry i at time t.  This index is an imperfect 
but useful proxy for assessing the extent of restructuring.  Note that the finer is the partition of the economy 
into sectors, the greater is the value of this index.  The estimates of values of values of EAI for Russia and 
several other countries are presented in Table 18.  The estimates reported in Table 18 are labeled EAI-4 
because they are computed based on data on four sectors of the economy; these sectors are agriculture, 
industry, construction, and other.  Note that unlike ESI, the values of EAI for Russia are comparable to some 
non-transition economies.  Employment shifts are less dramatic than exports and imports shifts.  It is striking 
that according to EAI the restructuring process in Russia did not really start until 1994.   
Aggregate level uncertainty and lack of political and economic stability. 
                                                           
27 We can analogously define aggregate shock indexes based on relative price changes and on the changes in 
production mix.    
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Political instability creates extraneous uncertainty that is an obstacle to economic development.  It is 
useful to distinguish between long- and short-term political uncertainty.  Long-term uncertainty refers to 
major political upheavals and changes, such as major shifts in power and ideology through the election 
process, and the possibility for a change in power by unconstitutional means.  Such political events may 
affect investment and the long-term commitments necessary for stable growth, but are less relevant for day-
to-day transactions in a market economy.  Long-term uncertainty is unavoidable in a democracy where the 
political spectrum is as polarized as it is in Russia today.  Short-term uncertainty is manifested by frequent 
changes in day-to-day operations of the government that disrupt business transactions and require continual 
adjustments on the part of economic agents.  At least in theory, short-term uncertainty can and should be 
eliminated.   
Unfortunately, even the short-term situation had been highly unstable in Russia.  For instance, the 
government has a propensity to be late with payments for the goods and services it purchases.  No 
transparent rule determines the priorities by which the government fulfils its financial obligations.  On the 
other side, many large enterprises have accumulated tax debts to the government.  In 1997, only 8% of the 
government tax revenues collected were in cash.  The rest were in the form of “vsaimozachetov” -- 
consolations of mutual debts.
28  The conditions of these mutual debt cancellations may or may not include 
interest or adjustment for inflation.  Moreover, tax regulations are subject to frequent changes and arbitrary 
interpretations and practices discussed above. Politically connected businesses are able to minimize their tax 
liabilities, while enterprises without political connections are open to extreme taxation.  Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994) present a model of bargaining between politicians and managers where bribes and subsidies arise 
endogenously.     
Even assuming that the current government remains in power, the Russian political-economic 
landscape is highly unpredictable.  The fiscal situation needs immediate attention.  While the main demand 
shocks associated with transition, such as removal of price controls and the opening of Russia to 
international trade are a few years behind them, there remains a real possibility of devastating fiscal shocks 
in the future.  The share of federal expenditures on debt service has grown rapidly, from 8% in 1994 to 
17.4% in 1995 and reaching over 30% in 1996.  In 1997 the official budget deficit was 7 % of GDP, but in 
reality was even larger due to delayed wage payments to government employees and to companies from 
whom it purchased goods and services.  Federal wage arrears are just a form of involuntary, off-book debt 
finance.  On a more positive note, the share of subsides in the official federal budget declined from 3.5% of 
                                                           
28 Finansovie Izvestie, 01/13/98 p.3 reported that a substantial fraction of non-payment is by the government; however, 
direct nonpayment by the government amounts to less than 10% of all non-payments.  According to the MBK study of 
the 210 largest Russian enterprises, only 8% of tax payments to the government are in cash.   The rest is “zacheti.”  The 
only exception is the liquor industry where 50% of tax revenues are cash.  
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GDP in 1994 to 1.7% in 1996.  Nevertheless, a number of enterprises still depend on hidden subsidies, often 
on a local level.  For instance, the city of Moscow purchases its automobile fleet at inflated prices from 
"Moskvich," a car manufacturer located in Moscow.  A number of insolvent enterprises have accumulated 
large debts for energy, but utilities are required to continue supplying electricity to these enterprises.   
While Russia has done much to get control of triple digit inflation (12% in 1997), price stability has 
been destroyed by continued government borrowing,
29 bank insolvency, and the impending inflationary 
finance.  The latest default has shut Russia out of the international capital market and will do so for an 
unpredictable future.  Printing money is the only recourse left to finance a weak government, but its 
consequences make the government even weaker.  Attempts to control inflation in recent years have 
effectively replaced inflationary finance with involuntary loans in the form of delayed payments to 
government employees and contractors, as well as by forcing suppliers to deliver products and energy to 
enterprises not able to pay for them.  Current and impending defaults on these past debts will make those 
practices more costly in the future.  Nonetheless, the government will be tempted to continue utilizing and 
expanding them.  When political instability makes the discount rate very high, the state myopically perceives 
payment arrears as cheap and available credit, while heavily discounting the future harm they cause.  In 
many ways the intertemporal model sketched above applies to governments as well as to managers. 
Retaining state employees requires paying them at least their reservation wage.  The less certain and 
the more overdue the wages, the greater these wages must be on average.  Current nominal compensation on 
state jobs has appeared unattractive to many workers relative to the jobs in the private sector.  In 1996 an 
unemployed individual was 14% more likely to find a state-sector job than a private enterprise job.  
Individuals from the economically inactive population who joined the labor force were twice as likely to 
find a job in the government sector relative to private enterprises (Sabirianova, 1998).  In contrast, 
individuals employed by private enterprises who changed jobs without experiencing unemployment spells 
are about 40% more likely to accept a job in another private enterprise than to find a state-enterprise job.  If 
the worker participation constraint is binding, delayed compensation may cause employees to quit or supply 
less effort or fewer hours.  In fact, Earle and Sabirianova (1999) find that probability of arrears positively 
covaries with firm age, size, state ownership, and declining performance.  Paying wages on time may be the 
cheapest way of retaining sufficient labor for satisfactory job performance.  The same applies to government 
purchases of goods and services.  Uncertain payment means that the price of a commodity purchased by the 
government includes both an expected interest charge and a risk premium.  Economic agents who are forced 
to accept late payments may or may not be the agents with the smallest discount rate, resulting in further 
dead-weight losses.  Finally, wage arrears encourage theft and corruption by affected employees.  When  
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arrears are chronic, the "interest" and "risk premium" for wage arrears often take the form of ignoring 
corruption.  
Once its budget is under control, the government can reduce the implicit cost of wage arrears by 
legislation that removes most of the risks associated with it.  The law might require indexing late wages to 
inflation and including interest payments on delayed compensation.  Right now, the Russian law effectively 
allows employers to arbitrarily postpone wages without late payment penalties or interest.  Arrears are 
mounting in the private sector as well.  The problem of arrears in the private sector can not be solved until 
the government becomes prompt in fulfilling its financial obligations.   
The health care sector presents an interesting practical example of corruption induced by payment 
arrears.  Wages of medical professionals in Russia have always been less than the national average, making 
the medical profession less appealing for materially oriented individuals.  From Table 19, health care 
workers earn 78% of Russian average wage, at least officially.  But wages of health care employees are 
routinely delayed. Russia guarantees free medical care as a constitutional right.  Expenditures on health care 
are very small-- estimated by the Ministry of Finance at 3.4% of GDP.  In contrast, health care expenditures 
in other East European countries are 5-8% of GDP and Western health care expenditures in many countries 
are higher still.  According to the official statistics, out-of-pocket expenditures on health care are a trivial 5% 
of the total health care bill, but the truth is much different.  A study conducted by the Institute of Social 
Studies found that 45% of health care costs are direct out-of-pocket costs.  Correcting for out-of-pocket 
expenditures raises total health care expenditures in Russia to 6% of GDP, much like neighboring 
countries.
30   These take the form of doctors illegally proving services for private fees while using the 
facilities of state hospitals free of charge.  Certainly, the emergence of a private market for medical services 




By the mid-to late-1990s, Russia had freed most prices, privatized a large fraction of state firms and 
brought inflation under control.  Most Western economists, including the authors, think these are the 
primary first ingredients for an effective reform package.  Despite this, official numbers imply that Russia 
has suffered a major and protracted output decline during the 90s.  What has caused the decline? 
To start, it cannot be overemphasized that the extent of the decline may be overstated by faulty 
output measures.  State data tend to ignore smaller, private firms and focus on larger, previously state-run 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
29 GKO market share by holder is: Russian commercial banks 30%, Sberbank 25%, Central bank of Russia 15%, 
Foreign investors 30%, as of summer 1998; source Aton Capital Group. 
30 Izvestie 3 June, 1988 p.1 Starie Mifi o Belom xalate  
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firms.  But to the extent that the numbers reflect some truth, and subsidiary data suggest that they do, can the 
decline be explained? 
Russia, more than any other formerly communist country, has undergone the equivalent to post-war 
demobilization 45 years after the fact.  Russia moved from a military-like social and economic structure to a 
decentralized economy in a very short period of time.  The reforms differed from military demobilization 
because they were accompanied by major political changes—a revolution of sorts--that is still evolving.  In 
victorious countries wartime demobilization merely reverted to existing prewar forms.  In defeated 
countries, occupation forces helped impose new permanent political and legal institutions that provided a 
long-term framework for future development.  Russian political and legal institutions are hardly set and 
considerable uncertainty surrounds their future evolution.  But even with a reliable and stable political 
framework, demobilization of the kind needed in Russia requires huge changes in the allocation of 
resources.  Historically, demobilization has been associated with large, but temporary output declines. 
Because capital in place is not easily converted or transported to other uses, there is an inevitable 
transition period during which current consumption falls while labor and other factors move from one sector 
to another.  This movement requires investments in those sectors favored by changes in relative prices.  But 
because quasi-rents are still available in older, declining sectors, and because real wages are declining, the 
older sectors die out only slowly.   Output gradually declines in the dying sectors.  Since investment is 
required in the new sectors, and is limited by the desire for current consumption, large increases in output in 
the growing sectors take time to occur. In addition, the speed of adjustment in Russia has been slowed by an 
unfortunate Soviet legacy that will take time to overcome.  Capital endowments of the early 1990’s gave 
Russia a short-term comparative advantage in industries where it is unlikely to have a long-term comparative 
advantage.  
It has been only a few years since privatization was completed and prices, along with the trade 
regime, were liberalised.  This is a relatively short time to adjust to one of the largest shocks ever to hit a 
country, not to mention one with shaky and evolving institutions that have not been conducive to economic 
growth.  The Russian political structure has been rocky and the reform process has been constrained by what 
is politically possible and expedient.  Policies and personalities have changed abruptly.  Even the basic 
structure of government is potentially unstable.  Law enforcement is spotty, tax collection is difficult, and 
information on what is actually occurring in firms is hard to obtain.  This environment has led to inefficient 
behavior by managers and has impeded growth and recovery of previous living standards.   
Still, it is early to paint too gloomy a picture.  The situation may not be as bad as it appears.  
Looking beyond the current crisis, available evidence indicates substantial shifts in international trade, in the 
composition of output, and a rise in the service sector.  More troublesome is the apparent lack of labor 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
31 See Johnson et al. (1997b; 1999) for studies of the inefficiencies inherent in the “unofficial economy”  
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mobility between sectors and the inability of the central government to live within its means.  And while 
much has been achieved in getting previously state owned capital into private hands, much less has occurred 
in developing new medium- and larger-scale private businesses that will be the engine of Russia’s future 
growth. It is said that much of Poland’s recent success has come from new enterprises.  Once the financial 
and legal system gain a permanent footing, and the government stabilizes, the transition will surely continue.  
An era of positive growth may well follow as new industries and private capital replace old industries and 
the formerly state owned firms.  Recently demobilized, Russia may soon enjoy the benefit of a 
decentralized, civilian-style market economy.  
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Table 1.  Structure of Trade 
STRUCTURE OF RUSSIAN EXTERNAL TRADE 
 Exports  Imports   
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1992 1993 1994  1995 1996
Machinery and equipment, %  8.9 6.5 8.3 10 9.4 37.7 38.8  35.2  33.7 31.7
Mineral products (incl.  fuels), %  52.1 46.7 45.1 41.9 48 2.7 4  6.5  6.2 6.1
Chemicals, %  6.1 6 8.2 9.9 8.5 9.3 6.2  9.9  10.9 14.6
Metals, metal products and 
precious stones, % 
16.4 23.2 26.5 26.1 23.3 3.3 3.5 6.8 8.4 10
Food and agricultural products, %  3.9 3.8 4.2 3.4 3.7 26 22.2 27.7 28.3 25.2
Wood Pulp and paper, %  3.7 4.2 3.9 5.6 4.1 1.2 0.5  1.5  2.4 3.3
Textiles, %  0.6 0.4 2 1.4 1.1 12.2 13.9  7.9  5.7 4.8
Leather and fur products, %  0.2 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.4 1.9 2.6 0.5 0.3 0.4
Other, %  8.1 9 1.3 1.3 1.5 5.7 13.3  4  4.1 3.8
Total, billion USD  42.37 44.30 66.86 80.07 86,96 36.98 26.81 38.66 46.61 45.40
ESI/ISI-5 15.7 17 7.8 11.4 17.1  27.9  5.1 10.8
    
Non CIS plus CIS trade, but excluding unrecorded trade, Source: Goskomstat 
STRUCTURE OF THE US EXTERNAL TRADE
 Exports  Imports   
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1992 1993 1994  1995 1996
Food and Beverages, %  9.151 8.91 8.36 8.769 9.067 5.144 4.734 4.637  4.43 4.4447
Industrial supplies and materials, 
% 
24.89 26.25 24.18 25.42 24.18 26.21 25.86 24.68 24.69 26.083
Capital goods (excl automotive 
vehicles parts & engines),% 
39.99 39.86 40.84 40.6 41.35 25.03 25.84 27.58 29.54 28.511
Automotive vehicles parts and 
engines, % 
10.67 11.49 11.5 10.73 10.62 17.11 17.37 17.69 16.52 16.048
Consumer goods (excl automotive 
vehicles parts & engines), % 
11.67 11.97 11.94 11.18 11.45 22.87 22.75 21.88 21.34 21.29
Other, %  3.633 1.511 3.165 3.299 3.333 3.635 3.444 3.53  3.483 3.623
Total, billion USD  440.4 456.8 502.4 575.9 612.1 536.5 589.4 668.6 749.4 803.2
ESI/ISI-5 5.0 5.3 3.6 2.7 2.1  4.3  3.9 3.1
 
Table 2.  The Share of Trade in Russian Output 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Ratio of the value of exports converted to rubles according 
to the exchange rate to GDP 
0.64 0.39 0.28 0.28 0.23
Ratio of the value of imports converted to rubles according 
to the exchange rate to GDP 
-0.50 -0.31 -0.23 -0.23 -0.17
Ratio of the value of exports to GNP computed in world 
prices 
0.056 0.062 0.105 0.128 0.143
Ratio of the value of imports to GNP computed in world 
prices 
0.049 0.038 0.061 0.074 0.075
Based on IMF data  
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Table 3.  Share of Different Modes of Transportation in Passenger Transport 
 RUSSIA-96  RUSSIA-97  US-91  US-94 POLAND-92  POLAND-95 
Rail 42.60 41.90 0.68 0.57 43.35  40.80
Auto 41.60 42.80 82.41 81.87 51.86  52.15
Water 0.30 0.20  
Air 15.50 15.10 16.96 17.51 4.79  7.06
Total Passenger km, bn  396.2 3434.5 3773.2 75.2  65.2
Total Passenger km, per capita  2677.3 13793.3 14401.5 1957.3  1687.4
Sources: FI, 31 mart 1988, Goskomstat RF, Eno transportation foundation, transportation in America;GUS, Rocznik 
Statyczny 
 
Table 4. Ratio: credit to non-financial sector/GDP in selected Eastern European Countries 
 1993 1994 1995 1996
Russia (Goskomstat data)  18  10 6
Russia (CBR data)  20.4  19.6 12 10.4
Poland 21.3  19.8 19.7 22.1
Hungary 28.4  26.5 23 22.9
Czech Republic  73.1  72.9 63.8 61.1
Slovakia 71.5  60.4 59.2 62.4
Romania 24.4  19 22.7 24.6
Slovenia 22.2  22.9 27.5 28.7
Bulgaria 67.8  51 41.3 69.5
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Table 5.  Life Expectancy at Birth 
 1990 1993 1994 1995 CHANGE  90  TO  95,  % 
Bulgaria     
Male  68.4 67.7 67.2 67.1 -1.9
Female  75.2 75.1 74.8 74.9 -0.4
Czech  Republic     
Male  67.5 68.9 69.5  70 3.7
Female  76 76.6 76.6 76.9 1.2
Hungary     
Male  65.1 64.5 64.8 65.3 0.3
Female  73.7 73.8 74.2 74.5 1.1
Latvia     
Male  64.2 61.6 60.7 60.8 -5.3
Female  74.6 73.8 72.9 73.1 -2.0
Poland       
Male  66.5 67.4 67.5 67.6 1.7
Female 75.5  76  76.1  76.4 1.2
Romania     
Male  66.6 65.9 65.7 
Female  73.1 73.3 73.4 
Russia     
Male  63.8 58.9 57.6 58.3 -8.6
Female  74.3 71.9 71.2 71.7 -3.5
Source: European Bank of reconstruction and development transition report (London 1997) 
 
Table 6 
 LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH IN 1994  POVERTY HEADCOUNT FOR 93-95 (AS % 
OF THE POPULATION) 
 Mail  Female 
Bulgaria 67.2 74.8 15 
Czech Republic  69.5 76.6 1 
Hungary 64.8 74.2 2 
Latvia 60.7 72.9 22 
Poland   67.5 76.1 14 
Romania 65.7 73.4 39 
Russia 57.6 71.2 44 
 
Table 7. Income Distribution  
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Gini  coefficient 0.26  0.29 0.4  0.41 0.381 0.375 0.375
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Table 8.  Consumption of Selected Food Products, Physical Quantities Per Capita 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Meat and meat products (kg)  69  63 55 54 53
Milk and milk products (kg)  386  347 281 294 278
Eggs (units)  297  288 263 250 234
Fish and fish products (kg)  20.3  15.8 12.3 11.9 10
Sugar and confectionery (kg)  47.2  37.8 30 31 31
Vegetables (kg)  89  86 77 71 65
Fruit (kg)  35  35 32 29  
Bread and bread products (kg)  119  120 125 124 124
Potatoes (kg)  106  112 118 127 122
 
Table 9.  Agricultural Production 
M, TONES  1992  1993  1994 1995 1996 CHANGE 92-96 
Grain (after processing)  107 99.1 81.3 63.4 69.3 -0.352
Potatoes 38.3  37.7  33.8 39.7 38.5 0.0052
Vegetables 10  9.8  9.6 11.2 10.7 0.07
Meat (slaughter weight)  8.3  7.5  6.8 5.8 5.3 -0.361
Milk 47.2  46.5  42.8 39.3 35.7 -0.244
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Table 10.  Distribution of Output and Employment by Sector of Industry 
   1992 1993 1994 1995  1996
Electricity 
production 
Number of firms  943 895 1096 1165  1104
 Number of employees, thousands 626 666 710 750  771
 Real output 1990=100  96 91 83 80  80
 Percentage of output produced by fully private companies    7.8
  Capacity  utilization  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 Real output per worker 1992=1  1.00 0.89 0.76 0.70  0.68
 Value of output as a share of 
GDP 
0.058 0.064 0.078 0.074 0.082
   
Fuel 
production 
Number of firms  725 869 1004 952  1075
 Number of employees, thousands 870 886 860 846  808
 Real output 1990=100  87 77 69 69  67
 Percentage of output produced by fully private companies    2.1
 Capacity utilization (for coal)  86 79 72 72  72
 Real output per worker 1992=1  1.00 0.87 0.80 0.82  0.83
 Value of output as a share of 
GDP 
0.168 0.115 0.088 0.099 0.098
   
Black 
metallurgy 
Number of firms  349 631 977 904  1154
 Number of employees, thousands 795 788 738 727  718
 Real output 1990=100  77 65 53 57  56
 Percentage of output produced by fully private companies    16.5
 Capacity utilization (for steel)  71 69 60 67  68
 Real output per worker 1992=1  1.00 0.85 0.74 0.81  0.81
 Value of output as a share of 
GDP 
0.074 0.058 0.048 0.055 0.047
   
Color 
metallurgy 
Number of firms  327 694 1244 1333  1836
 Number of employees, thousands 532 542 517 549  526
 Real output 1990=100  68 59 53 55  53
 Percentage of output produced by private closely held companies    23.1
  Capacity  utilization  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 Real output per worker 1992=1  1.00 0.85 0.80 0.78  0.79
 Value of output as a share of 
GDP 
0.079 0.054 0.038 0.039 0.029





Number of firms  1479 3232 5195 4881  5147
 Number of employees, thousands 1143 1109 1011 968  930 
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 Real output 1990=100  73 58 44 47  42
 Percentage of output produced by fully private companies    26.2
 Capacity utilization varies substantially by product in a range from 15% to 69% 
 Real output per worker 1992=1  1.00 0.82 0.68 0.76  0.71
 Value of output as a share of 
GDP 
0.074 0.051 0.043 0.048 0.041
   
Machinery Number of firms  13505 30154 46558 47728  53804
 Number of employees, thousands 7153 6451 5537 4876  4350
 Real output 1990=100  75 63 42 39  34
 Percentage of output produced by fully private companies    24.6
   
 Real output per worker 1992=1  1.00 0.93 0.72 0.76  0.75
 Value of output as a share of 
GDP 
0.184 0.145 0.114 0.109 0.102




Number of firms  8187 12309 16767 16424  19897
 Number of employees, thousands 1813 1641 1535 1383  1260
 Real output 1990=100  78 63 44 44  34
 Percentage of output produced by fully private companies    37.6
 Capacity utilization for paper 
manufactures 
68 59 47 57 49
 Real output per worker 1992=1  1.00 0.89 0.67 0.74  0.63
 Value of output as a share of 
GDP 
0.042 0.030 0.027 0.031 0.023




Number of firms  5053 6767 8009 7925  9441
 Number of employees, thousands 1136 1095 1040 973  903
 Real output 1990=100  78 65 47 44  33
 Percentage of output produced by fully private companies    46.6
 Capacity utilization (cement)  74 62 48 45  36
 Capacity utilization (wall 
materials) 
74 67 52 50 40
 Real output per worker 1992=1  1.00 0.86 0.66 0.66  0.53
 Value of output as a share of 
GDP 
0.032 0.030 0.028 0.029 0.025
   
Light 
industry 
Number of firms  10150 15562 22126 22347  22249
 Number of employees, thousands 1845 1699 1600 1332  1138
 Real output 1990=100  64 49 26 19  14
 Percentage of output produced by fully private companies    55.2 
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 Capacity utilization (textile 
garments) 
63 54 34 21 13
 Real output per worker 1992=1  1.00 0.83 0.47 0.41  0.35
 Value of output as a share of 
GDP 
0.063 0.036 0.019 0.015 0.010




Number of firms  7073 8784 12636 13902  1840
 Number of employees, thousands 1554 1556 1554 1506  1434
 Real output 1990=100  76 69 57 52  48
 Percentage of output produced by fully private companies    44.8
 Capacity utilization (cheese)  72 73 63 51  46
 Capacity utilization (non-alcoholic 
beverages) 
19 19 17 17 14
 Real output per worker 1992=1  1.00 0.91 0.75 0.71  0.68
 Value of output as a share of 
GDP 
0.105 0.092 0.073 0.072 0.064
   
Annual increase in industrial output, %   -13.3 -21.5 -2.0  -4.0
Source: Goskomstat  
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Table 11. Distribution of Unemployment Duration for Different Age Categories 
DURATION OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
UNDER 18 YEARS OLD  18 TO 25   ALL UNEMPLOYED 
under 1 month  6.3%  8.1  9.0 
1 to 3 months  29.8  27.4  23.3 
3 to 6 months  28.8  29.4  29.5 
6 months to 1 year  34.0  28.9  27.9 
over 1 year  1.0  6.3  10.5 
average unemployment 
duration 
5.0 5.3  6.4 
Source:N.  Dunaev Young People in the Labor Market p.81 Voprosi Economiki.  1/1998. 
 
Table 12.  Computers Manufactured in Russia (in thousands)  





8.8 313 254 137 113 82.1 62.3 118 144 
ADC* estimate of 
computer output 
   650 875 1050  1400 
% change in output according to 
Goscomstat 
estimate 
    -27.35 -24.12 89.41  22.03 
ADC 
estimate 
    34.62 20.00  33.33 
*ADC is a private market participant in Russian computer industry  
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Table 13.  Share of Employment by Sector of the Economy 
 1985  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995  1996
Number of Employed  74937  75325 73848 72071 70825 68484  66441  66000
Industry 0.323  0.303 0.303 0.296 0.294 0.271 0.259  0.247
Agriculture and forestry  0.143  0.132 0.135 0.143 0.146 0.154 0.151  0.148
Construction 0.095  0.120 0.115 0.109 0.101 0.099 0.093  0.095
Transport and 
communication 
0.098 0.077 0.078 0.078 0.076 0.078 0.079  0.079
Trade, catering, material 
supply and procurement 
0.083 0.078 0.076 0.079 0.090 0.095 0.101  0.104
Housing (public util.  & 
services) 
0.041 0.043 0.043 0.041 0.042 0.044 0.045   
Public health, physical 
culture etc. 
0.050 0.056 0.058 0.059 0.060 0.064 0.067   
Education, culture, art  0.085 0.096 0.098 0.104 0.102 0.108 0.110 
Science and science 
services 
0.046 0.042 0.042 0.032 0.032 0.027 0.025   
Credit, finance, insurance  0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.012   
     
Administration 0.019  0.024 0.023 0.021 0.023 0.024  0.030 
Of which:       
Regional and local 
judicial bodies 
84 93 99 108 115 125  131   
EAI-4*   0.96 2.61 2.15 4.84  4.30  2.74
EAI-4 index is computed as the sum of absolute values in percentage of individuals employed in Agriculture, Industry, 
Construction and Other.  Employment in category Other is equal to the total employment minus employment in 
Agriculture, Industry and Construction.  
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Table 14.  Per Capita Foreign Direct Investment in CEE countries, US $ 
 1992  MID-1996 
Albania 51  97* 
Bulgaria 18  69 
Czech Republic  151 586 
Croatia 128  268 
Estonia 156  424 
Hungary 457  1299 
Latvia 78  145* 
Lithuania 20  85* 
Poland 37  -- 
Romania 24  84* 
Russia 19  44 
Slovakia 44  152 
Slovenia 522  895 
Ukraine 3  21 
*July 1996 for Romania, March 1996 for Albania, End-1995 Latvia, October 1996 Lithuania  
Source: OECD Economic Surveys, 1997 Bulgaria 
 
Table 15.  Ratios of Profits to Revenues (profit margins) by Industry Sector 
 1992 1993 1994 1995
Electricity production  0.18 0.16 0.13 0.18
Fuel production  0.28 0.20 0.14 0.18
Black metallurgy  0.23 0.30 0.14 0.16
Color metallurgy  0.30 0.33 0.28 0.24
Chemical and petrochemicals  0.26 0.22 0.16 0.17
Machinery 0.24 0.27 0.15 0.13
Wood, pulp & paper  0.17 0.20 0.11 0.12
Construction materials  0.11 0.15 0.10 0.08
Light industry*  0.23 0.21 0.14 0.10
Food processing  0.17 0.17 0.13 0.11
*For 1996 Goskomstat estimates that profits of light industry are negative 
 
Table 16 Barter, Credit and Investment Indicators 
MAIN  INDICATORS/YEARS  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Total overdue credit at the end of the year as a percentage of 
GDP 
6.0 4.5 8.9 10.4 17.8 25.7
Investment, change relative to previous year, %     
Investment in main capital  -15 -40 -12 -24  -13  -18 -5
Construction of residential housing  -20 -16 0.7 -6  5  -16 -5
Share of barter transactions among all sales of manufacturing 
firms, % 
6 9 17 22 35 41* 
*First six month of 1997. Source: Goskomstat and Russian Economic Barometer 
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Table 17.  Russian Price Level Relative to the US Price Level, % 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Overall  2.5  9.1 18.3 32.7 50.7 60.2 58
Oil  1.1  7 18.2  32 45.6 49.8 53
Coal  0.8  7 10.5 24.4  37 55.4 50
Electricity  0.6 3.3 8.4  20.4  28.4 38.8 43.9
 
Table 18. Estimates of Employment Adjustment Index for Selected Countries 
  1991  1992  1993 1994 1995 1996 
Russia 0.91  2.61 2.15 4.84 4.30 2.74 
Romania   6.33 2.81 5.63  
Poland   5.31 2.38 2.23 1.64  
Hungary   6.94 2.52 2.65 0.87 
Ukraine   2.28 4.94 7.09 4.60 
Spain   3.33 1.69 2.14 1.96 
 
 